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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
RANDY J. VANTIENDEREN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010376-CA 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction1 for Unlawful Distribution of a 
Controlled or Counterfeit Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2001); Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance or 
Counterfeit Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2001); Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal 
to Stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); 
and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drug(s), a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2)(a) (Supp. 2001); in the Third Judicial District 
Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
1
 A copy of the "Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 52-54, is attached in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the trial court err by accepting the guilty plea of Appellant Randy J. 
Vantienderen ["Mr. Vantienderen"] without explaining that, by pleading guilty, Mr. 
Vantienderen would give up the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury? 
Standard of Review: "Whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness."2 
Preservation of the Argument: The trial court's failure to conduct the required 
colloquy, which must include advising the defendant of his right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, was plain error. See Tarnawieckt 2000 UT App 186, f l8 ("The 
trial court's failure to conduct the required colloquy on the record advising defendant of 
her right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury . . . is prejudicial and therefore 
harmful"); State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (trial court's 
acceptance of guilty plea was plain error where the court failed to inform him of right 
against self-incrimination, nature and elements of the offense, and the possible penalties). 
Further, this issue was preserved by Mr. Vantienderen's Petition to Withdraw Guilty 
2
 State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 1J9, 22 P.3d 1242 ("Visser II") (There are three State v. 
Visser cases. In State v. Visser, 1999 UT App 019,1(18-19, 973 P.2d 998 ("Visser I") this Court 
held that the trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) by not informing the 
defendant of his right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury necessitated reversal of the 
conviction. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this Court, Visser II, 2000 UT 88, If 13, 
holding that the defendant was informed of this right because his plea was accepted midway 
through his trial. Finally, in State v. Visser, 2001 UT App 215, TJ19, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
("Visser III"), this Court found that the defendant was competent to enter the guilty plea and his 
counsel's encouragement of the entry did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.) See 
also State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, f6, 5 P.3d 1222. 
2 
Plea. R. 57-58. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the trial court err in imposing consecutive sentences where Mr. Vantienderen 
committed nonviolent, victimless crimes as a result of a cocain addiction for which he 
has never received treatment? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the sentencing decisions of a trial court for 
abuse of discretion." State v. Pierson. 2000 UT App 274, f 10, 12 P.3d 103. "Abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were inherently unfair 
or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive sentence." State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 
651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). Specifically, '"[a]n abuse of 
discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors.'" State v. 
Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Ultimately, "[a]n appellate court may 
only find abuse if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted 
by the trial court." Montova. 929 P.2d at 358 internal quotations omitted). 
Preservation of the Argument: This argument is preserved at R. 77, 98. 
RELEVANT STATUTE AND RULE 
The following statute is relevant on appeal: Concurrent or Consecutive Sentences, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999). The full text of this statute is provided in Addendum 
3 
B. 
The following rule is relevant on appeal: Pleas, Utah R. Crim. 11 (2001). The full 
text of this rule is provided in Addendum C.3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 3 November 2000, Mr. Vantienderen was charged by Information with one 
count of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, one count of failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop, and one count of driving while under the influence 
of alcohol and/or drugs. R. 2-5. 
A plea hearing was held 14 December 2000. R. 102. There, the defense counsel 
indicated that Mr. Vantienderen wished to plea guilty to the charges. R. 102 [2-4]. The 
trial court informed Mr. Vantienderen that, by pleading guilty, he would give up his right 
to a preliminary hearing. R. 102 [3-4]. The court reviewed each charge, ascertained 
whether Mr. Vantienderen understood the charges, and heard Mr. Vantienderen's 
statements concerning them. R. 102 [6-9]. The court explained the minimum and 
maximum sentences. R. 102 [9]. Then the court advised Mr. Vantienderen that, by 
pleading guilty, he would give up his right to a jury trial, his right to the presumption of 
innocence, his right to testify, his right against self-incrimination, and his right to 
3
 Rule 11 was amended after the issuance of the 2001 Utah Court Rules. Utah R. Crim. 
11 (Oct. 2001 Supp.) However, because the proceedings below occurred prior to the effective 
date of the amendment, the former rule is relied upon in this case. 
4 
subpoena his own witnesses and cross-examine the State's witnesses. R. 102 [10]. The 
court further advised Mr. Vantienderen that, by pleading guilty, he would give up his 
right to appeal. Id. 
The court failed, however, to inform Mr. Vantienderen that he had the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury. Id. Additionally, the plea agreement which 
Mr. Vantienderen signed did not mention the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury. R. 28-35. Mr. Vantienderen pled guilty to all four charges . R. 28-34, 102 
[13-14]. 
Prior to his sentencing, the Utah Department of Corrections prepared a 
presentence investigation report recommending that Mr. Vantienderen be committed to 
prison for an "indeterminate term as prescribed by law," and that he be placed into "an 
intensive inpatient drug treatment program" upon parole. R. 104 [21]. The report did not 
recommend concurrent sentences. Id 
There were some errors in the report. The report implied that Mr. Vantienderen 
has been in prison eight times, Id. at 10-15, 19, when actually, he has been to prison only 
three times.4 Additionally, contrary to implications in the report, Mr. Vantienderen has 
4
 R. 103 [5-6]. The first time he went to prison was in March of 1989. R. 103 [4]. In 
March and April of that year he was sentenced for four different offenses, and he served time for 
all of those offenses until January of 1992, when he was placed on parole. R. 103 [4-5], 104 [ 10-
13]. Because each offenses is listed separately in the presentence investigation report, it appears 
that he entered prison on four separate occasions. However, there was only one prison term for 
these offenses. 
The second time he entered prison was because of a technical violation of his parole. R. 
103 [5]. The third time was in 1992, when he was convicted for aggravated robbery. R. 103 [5], 
5 
not been convicted of a felony since 1992. R. 103 [5]. Further, Mr. Vantienderen has 
never received any treatment for his cocaine addiction, and has expressed great interest in 
receiving treatment. R. 45-48, 103 [6, 9], 104 [19]. 
Mr. Vantienderen was sentenced on 26 February 2001 to an indeterminate term of 
one to fifteen years in prison for the charge of unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance, an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for the charge of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years for failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and six months for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. R. 52-54. The terms imposed 
for the first and second charges are to run consecutively, and the terms imposed for the 
third and fourth charges are to run concurrently with the other terms. R. 53. 
Twenty-one days after the sentencing, on 19 March 2001, Mr. Vantienderen filed 
a handwritten document entitled "Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea" with the court. R. 
77-78, 96. The judge's law clerk wrote a memorandum outlining the history of the case, 
the State's objections to Mr. Vantienderen's Petition, and the standard of review for 
sentencing issues. R. 96-98. However, the court did not rule on Mr. Vantienderen's 
Petition. 
Mr. Vantienderen filed timely notice of appeal. R. 81 -83. 
104 [13-14]. This was his last felony conviction. R. 103 [5], 104 [14-15]. 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In exchange for cocaine to support his addiction, Mr. Vantienderen was providing 
cover for a woman, Honey Sue Quintana ["Ms. Quintana"], who was moving from motel 
room to motel room selling drugs. R. 104 [4]. On 31 August 2000, Investigator Dirk 
Watrous ["Investigator Watrous"] called Ms. Quintana and arranged to meet her at the 
Best Motel in Salt Lake City to purchase a quarter kilogram of cocaine.5 Before the 
transaction, Mr. Vantienderen drove into the area to determine whether there was a setup. 
Id. at 4. Police had initiated surveillance of the Best Motel, and observed Mr. 
Vantienderen drive from the Best Motel parking lot into the parking lot of an adjacent 
motel. Id. Then he turned onto State Street. Id 
Police attempted to pull him over for driving with an expired license plate. Id 
However, he continued to drive in what the police described as a "very careless, evasive 
manner." Id Police pursued, and Mr. Vantienderen continued driving. Id at 3-4. 
Eventually, Mr. Vantienderen struck a cement curb and disabled his car. Id at 4. He 
abandoned the car and fled on foot across a parking lot. Id He was apprehended a short 
time later. Id 
According to police, Mr. Vantienderen admitted that he had been scouting the 
Best Motel for signs of police, that he was under the influence of cocaine at that time, and 
5
 Id. at 3. Investigator Watrous spoke with both Ms. Quintana and Mr. Vantienderen on 
the telephone. Id. Mr. Vantienderen identified himself as "Joe," and later admitted that he was 
"Joe" who had spoken with Investigator Watrous on the telephone. 
7 
that he sells cocaine with Ms. Quintana.6 He also agreed to help the police gather more 
information about his suppliers. Id. Accordingly, he was released. IcL However, his 
suppliers became suspicious and left town. Id The police then filed the charges at issue 
in this case. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Vantienderen's conviction should be vacated and this case should be 
remanded with instructions to allow Mr. Vantienderen to withdraw his guilty plea. The 
trial court erred by accepting his plea in violation of Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Under the precedent of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) 
and State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), a trial court must strictly comply with 
Rule 11(e) in accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(e) indicates that a trial court may not 
accept the plea until it has found, among other things, that the defendant knows of his 
right to "a speedy public trial before an impartial jury," and that this right will be waived. 
Utah R. Crim 11(e)(3) (2001). 
In this case, the trial court discussed the terms of the plea agreement and the 
charges, R. 102 [5-8], the minimum and maximum penalties, R. 102 [9-10], and some 
constitutional rights which are relinquished upon a plea of guilty. R. 102 [10]. However, 
the court omitted to inform Mr. Vantienderen that he had a right to "a speedy public trial 
6
 Id. The police also indicated that Mr. Vantienderen admitted he is supplied with cocaine 
by a male Hispanic known as "Carlos." Id. 
8 
before an impartial jury." Further, Mr. Vantienderen's plea agreement did not mention 
this right, R. 28-35, and he was not informed of this right by any other means. 
This issue should be reviewed on the basis of plain error because a Rule 11(e) 
error existed, the error should have been obvious to the trial court in light of sound, 
unambiguous precedent requiring Rule 11(e) compliance,7 and the error is prejudicial as a 
matter of law.8 Further, the issue was preserved by Mr. Vantienderen's Petition to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed within thirty days after his sentencing. R. 57-58, 96. The 
Petition alleged that the court violated Mr. Vantienderen's right of due process and that 
he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 57-58. Because it is due process which 
gives rise to the requirement of strict compliance with Rule 11(e), this Petition preserved 
the issue. Thus, Mr. Vantienderen's conviction should be vacated, and he should be 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Alternatively, Mr. Vantienderen's sentence should be vacated and this case should 
be remanded for resentencing. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was 
unjustified by the facts in the presentence investigation report or by any other 
information on record. Further, the trial court did not consider the "gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant" as required under Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). Instead, 
7
 State v. TarnawieckL 2000 UT App 186, ]fl2, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 
772, 778 (Utah 1990). 
8
 Pharris. 798 P.2d at 777. 
9 
the trial court relied upon the prosecutor's bald assertion that the drugs involved in this 
case "came out of Mexico" R. 103 [10], and pronounced consecutive sentences on the 
basis that Mr. Vantienderen had linked himself "to a cartel that's international and it sells 
dope across international boundaries . . . . " IdL This violated due process, which 
"'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.'" State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, f34, 31 
P.3d 615 (quoting State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)). 
Finally, there is no basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences because the 
crimes alleged in this case were not violent and there were no victims involved. R. 104 
[3-5]. All of the alleged crimes were part of only one criminal episode, and Mr. 
Vantienderen did not evidence a total disregard for other people's lives and safety. 
Although the prosecutor asserted that Mr. Vantienderen ran from police, there is nothing 
to indicate that he endangered others in doing so. R. 103 [10]. Ultimately, the presentence 
investigation report did not recommend consecutive sentences, and the trial court abused 
its discretion in imposing them. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY 
WITH RULE 11 BY NOT INFORMING MR, VANTIENDEREN OF HIS 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY, THE 
COURT'S ACCEPTANCE OF HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS ERRONEOUS 
Beginning with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Gibbons, Utah 
10 
Courts have recognized that the grave consequences of pleading guilty to a crime 
necessitate reversal of the conviction where the trial court fails to conduct the required 
plea colloquy.9 As the United States Supreme Court observed in Boykin v. Alabama, "[a] 
plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it 
is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." 
Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Without the required colloquy, 
"[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats 
might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality." Id. at 242-43. 
Utah has codified a procedure to ensure that defendants enter their pleas of guilty 
with full awareness of the consequences and of the constitutional rights that they 
relinquish. Under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may 
not accept a guilty plea until it has found, among other things, that: 
the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open 
court, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived. 
Utah R.Crim. 11(e)(3) (2001) (emphasis added). The Gibbons jurisprudence clarifies that 
"'Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that the constitutional 
and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered.'" 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, |12 (citing Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312). "It is not 
9
 State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Utah 1987); State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 
186,1J21, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. Pharris. 798 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1990). 
11 
sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand 
the contents of the affidavit/' Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. Trial courts must comply by 
ensuring "that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty." Visser II. 2000 UT 88, ^|11, 22 P.3d 
1242. "Importantly, strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with Rule 11 is 
required when accepting a guilty plea." Tarnawieckl 2000 UT App 186, \\2 (citing State 
v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991)). While u[s]trict compliance . . . does not 
mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed," Visser IL 2000 UT 88, 
f 11, it does require that by some means the trial court must ensure that every part of Rule 
11 is complied with. Maguire. 830 P.2d at 218. 
In this case, the trial court failed to determine whether Mr. Vantienderen 
understood that, by pleading guilty, he would relinquish his right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury. During the plea colloquy, the trial court discussed the terms of 
the plea agreement and the charges. R. 102 [5-8]. The court discussed the minimum and 
maximum penalties for each charge. R. 102 [9-10]. Then, the court said the following: 
If you plead guilty, Mr. Vantienderen, you're giving up the rights that you 
have for a jury trial. You're presumed innocent, the State would have to 
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that you're guilty of all of the 
dements in all four of these charges. If the State couldn't do that, you'd be 
found not guilty. 
At the trial you'd have the right to testify, although you also have the right 
not to incriminate yourself. You'd have the right to call your own witnesses 
and have them subpoenaed, the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses 
and the right to appeal. 
12 
If you plead guilty today, you give up all of those rights. 
R. 102 [10]. Although the court mentioned that Mr. Vantienderen had a right to a "jury 
trial," the court failed to explain that Mr. Vantienderen had a right to "a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury." Utah R.Crim. 11(e)(3) (2001). 
Subsequently, the trial court referred to a "form" that was used to explain 
defendants' rights, and asked "[d]id your attorney review that with you?" Id. Mr. 
Vantienderen replied in the affirmative. Mr. Vantienderen also replied affirmatively 
when asked whether he had read the form personally and understood it. Id. at 11. It is 
unclear to which "form" the court was referring. The only relevant "form" which appears 
on record is the plea agreement. R. 28-35. The agreement does not mention or allude to 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. Id. Although paragraph five of 
the agreement states "I know that I have a right to a trial by jury," R. 30, it does not refer 
to the right of a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. 
This Court's opinion in State v. Tarnawiecki is directly on point. In that case, 
defendant Marha Tarnawiecki ["Ms. Tarnawiecki"] pled guilty to violating a protective 
order. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^ }4. During the plea colloquy, the defense counsel 
told the court that he had gone over Ms. Tarnawiecki's constitutional rights with her. Id, 
Tf4. The court discussed the minimum and maximum sentence for the charge, and then 
said "[a]nd if you plead guilty, you are admitting that [you committed the offense]. You 
won't go to trial, see witnesses, have a jury, appeal, and all of those constitutional rights 
that [defense counsel] has gone over with you? You understand all of that?" IcL In 
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response, Ms. Tamwiecki signed the plea agreement and submitted it to the court. IdL The 
court accepted it. IdL 
On appeal, this Court found that it was plain error for the trial court to accept Ms. 
Tamwiecki's plea after failing to advise her of her right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury. Id, ^[18. This Court explained, "[w]hile 'a rigid colloquy or rote recitation 
of the elements of Rule 11 is not required,... Rule 11(e) 'requires the trial court . . . to 
find that seven detailed and specific criteria have been fulfilled.'" Id, [^16 (citation 
omitted). Where the trial court fails to advise the defendant "of his right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury," Id, the conviction must be vacated and the case remanded with 
instructions to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id, ^[21. Accordingly, Ms. 
Tamwiecki's conviction was vacated and the case remanded. Id, ^21. 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Visser II that a defendant must be 
informed of his "right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury." Visser IL 2000 
UT 88, ^ 13. In that case, the defendant entered a plea of guilty midway through his trial 
on the charge of aggravated sexual assault. Id, ^[1. He later motioned to withdraw the 
plea, arguing that the trial court failed to inform him of his right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury. Id, [^6. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: 
The trial had already started without any complaint from defendant about 
pretrial delay. Accordingly, that right had been delivered and was no longer 
something defendant had a right to receive in the future. To talk about a 
speedy trial might confuse defendant, so the court elected not to discuss his 
right which had already been received. Similarly, defendant was not 
advised that he had the right to an impartial jury because the jury selection 
process had ended without complaint from defendant. . . . 
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Id. This Court reversed, explaining that "[a] knowing guilty plea . . . requires that a 
defendant be informed of his rights and understand that those rights are waived by virtue 
of the plea - even in the 'context of [this] particular case' where the plea was taken mid-
trial." Visser L 1999 UT App 19,115-18, 973 P.2d 998. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reversed this Court's holding, 
emphasizing that "[s]trict compliance does not require a specific method of 
communicating the rights enumerated by rule 11. As noted above, we have upheld the 
use of numerous methods of communication for rule 11 purposes." Visser II. 2000 UT 
88,113. Mr. Visser had received "personal trial experience up to the point of his plea 
agreement," and "this experience communicated at least as much as would the mere oral 
recitation of the 'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'" Id Significantly, 
the Court emphasized that this right must be communicated by some means, whether oral 
recitation, written document, or experience. Id., 111-13. 
In this case, Mr. Vantienderen was not fully informed by any means of his right to 
a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. The trial court did not mention this 
constitutional right, the right was not mentioned in the plea agreement, and unlike the 
defendant in Visser II. Mr. Vantienderen was not midway through trial when he tendered 
his plea. Like Ms. Tarnwiecki, he was not informed when he entered his plea and his 
conviction must, therefore, be vacated and this case remanded with instructions to allow 
Mr. Vantienderen to withdraw his guilty plea. 
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A, Mr, Vantienderen's Plea Should be Withdrawn Because it was Plainly 
Erroneous for the Trial Court to Accept the Plea When He Had Not Been 
Informed of His Right to a Speedy Public Trial Before an Impartial Jury 
The trial court committed plain error by accepting Mr. Vantienderen's guilty plea 
in violation of Rule 11(e).10 "'To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant has the 
burden of showing '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful."' Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^ fl 1 (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, a Rule 11(e) error exists. The trial court failed to inform Mr. 
Vantienderen of his right to a "speedy public trial before an impartial jury," Utah R. 
Crim. 11(e)(3) (2001), either during the plea colloquy, R. 102 [10], by written plea 
agreement, R. 28-35, or by other means. Additionally, this error should have been 
obvious to the trial court. The case law soundly establishes that a trial court must strictly 
10
 As this Court recently held in State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,f7, "we can review a 
plain error claim based on a violation of Rule 11." (Citing Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^ [11; 
State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, f 8, 996 P.2d 1065 ("Ostlerl") (There are two State v. Ostler 
cases. In Ostler I, 2000 UT App 28, [^27, this Court held that, due to the trial court's plain error 
of failing to comply with Rule 11(e), the defendant's conviction was vacated and the case 
remanded with instructions to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. In State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 
68,1[13, 427 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 ("Ostler II"), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's 
conclusion, "without commenting on its analysis," on the basis that the issue was preserved 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999)). See also Bovkin, 395 U.S. at 241-42 ("It was 
error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary."); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311 
(defendant had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and court remanded to the trial court to allow 
a withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction over the case); Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774 C°[I]n 
certain cases we may consider the failure to comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised on appeal to this court.'") (citing State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
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comply with Rule 11(e), and the failure to do so is error as a matter of law.11 There is no 
ambiguity regarding this duty. Finally, the error is prejudicial. Utah courts have found 
that a trial court's error in failing to comply with Rule 11 is fatally harmful.12 The right to 
a speedy trial before an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right which is 
relinquished by a plea of guilty, and the failure to so inform a defendant can never be 
considered harmless. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44. 
B. The Issue of the Trial Court's Failure to Strictly Comply with Rule 11(e) 
was Preserved by Mr, Vantienderen's Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea Filed 
Within Thirty Days After His Sentencing 
I ' 
Under the recently-decided precedent of Ostler II, Mr. Vantienderen's Petition to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed twenty-one days after his sentencing, preserved the issue of 
the faulty plea colloquy. The Utah Supreme Court held in Ostler II that: 
I 
[T]he thirty-day limitation on the filing of a motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest runs from the date of final disposition of the case at the 
district court. We overrule the holding in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 478 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), that section 77-13-6's thirty-day limitation on filing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea runs from the date of the plea colloquy. 
Ostler II. 2001 UT 68, ^[11. Under this holding, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
11
 Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14; Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, [^18; State v. Smith, 
812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774. 
12
 See Ostler I, 2000 UT App 28, f 27 ("We hold that the trial court erred by failing to 
strictly comply with Rule 11(e). That error should have been obvious to the trial court and was 
prejudicial to defendant."); Pharris, 798 P.2d at 777 ("Utah courts have found the failure to 
inform a defendant of the punishments possible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction.") (Citing 
Smith, 777 P.2d at 466; Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95). 
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preserves the issue so long as the motion is made within thirty days after sentencing. 
In this case, Mr. Vantienderen filed a handwritten Petition to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea on 19 March 2001, twenty-one days after his sentencing. R. 57-58, 96. The Petition 
alleged, primarily, that concurrent rather than consecutive sentences were promised to 
Mr. Vantienderen and that the "plea agreement was breached" by the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. R. 57. The Petition further alleged that Mr. Vantienderen's "due 
process rights have been violated" and that "the court must allow the defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea . . . . " R. 58. Although the document was not dated, a clerk's 
memorandum indicates that the Petition was filed 19 March 2001. R. 96. The trial court 
did not rule on the motion. 
Mr. Vantienderen's pro se Petition preserved the Rule 11(e) compliance issue 
because it requested that the plea be withdrawn and alleged that Mr. Vantienderen's right 
of due process was violated. Id. It is due process which necessitates strict compliance 
with Rule 11(e). Rule 11(e) articulates the basic rights relinquished upon a plea of guilty, 
these may be relinquished only by a defendant who voluntarily and knowingly does so.13 
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Boykin v. Alabama: 
A defendant who enters [a guilty plea] simultaneously waives several 
constitutional rights . . . . 'For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process 
Clause, it must be 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.' . . . Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is 
13
 State v. Visser, 2001 UT App 215, f7, 9, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (recognizing that Rule 
11 requirements are constitutional in nature); Ostler, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 28, [^6, 10 (describing 
Rule 11(e) requirements as articulations of constitutional rights) (citing Phams, 798 P.2d at 
778). 
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not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due 
process and is therefore void. 
Bovkin. 395 U.S. at 243 n.5 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938). Thus, 
Mr. Vantienderen's allegation that his due process right was violated properly preserved 
the issue of the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11, and his conviction should be 
vacated as a matter of law. 
II. BECAUSE MR. VANTIENDEREN'S CRIMES WERE VICTIMLESS. 
NON-VIOLENT CRIMES STEMMING FROM A DRUG ADDICTION 
FOR WHICH HE HAS NEVER RECEIVED HELP, THE SENTENCING 
COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS 
Consecutive sentences may be imposed only when certain conditions are met. In 
imposing consecutive sentences, a sentencing court must be guided by section 76-3-401 
of the Utah Code. Section 76-3-401 "favors concurrent sentences" rather than 
consecutive sentences. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). It also requires a 
sentencing court to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" before imposing consecutive 
sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). Further, a sentencing court must keep 
in mind that "[t]he Board is in a far better position than a court to monitor a defendant's 
subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in prison and to 
adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 
1995). Hence, "the Legislature, in enacting indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to 
give the Board of Pardons wide latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to 
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be," and concurrent sentences accomplish this goal better than consecutive sentences. Id. 
In this case, the sentencing court did not consider the required factors before 
imposing consecutive sentencing. After inquiring about the origin of the drugs at issue in 
this case, the sentencing court stated the following: 
Mr. Vantienderen, if it were an issue of consumption, then it would be 
different; but what you're doing is, you've linked yourself to a cartel that's 
international and it sells dope across international boundaries and that's a 
whole different issue than personal addiction. You've taken it many steps 
farther than simply having a drug problem and your willingness to deal and 
associate yourself with this international cartel as well as endangering the 
people in the city by your conduct in fleeing the police officers doesn't 
leave me an alternative other than the recommendation the State's made. 
I think you do need drug treatment and you can get it in prison and you 
can get it at Odyssey House after prison; but prison is where you have to go 
first. 
R. 103 [10]. There were no other comments or findings issued by the sentencing court. 
The court's observations are not supported by the information from the sentencing 
hearing, the information in the presentence investigation report, or any other information 
on record. The sentencing court relied upon the prosecutor's bald statement that the drugs 
at issue "came out of Mexico" and pronounced consecutive sentences on the basis that 
Mr. Vantienderen has linked himself "to a cartel that's international and it sells dope 
across international boundaries " R. 103 [10]. 
There is little basis for this assumption by the court. According to the official 
version of offense in the presentence investigation report, police had previously 
investigated a drug trafficking organization led by Mardequedo Valdez-Penaloza and 
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Miguel Angel Huapevilla. R. 104 [3]. Shortly after this investigation ended, the incident 
mvolvmg Mr. Vantienderen occurred. The report does not indicate that Mr. Vantienderen 
was directly involved with the drug trafficking organization. Id. The only indication of 
this was the prosecutor's assertion concerning the origin of the drugs. R. 103 [7]. The 
court's reliance upon this and its subsequent assumption violates the requirement of due 
process. The due process clause in both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
"requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.'" State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, p 4 , 31 
P.3d 615 (quoting State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)). 
The trial court's baseless assumption that Mr. Vantienderen was involved a drug 
trafficking organization should not have been the basis for imposing consecutive 
sentences. Even if the prosecutor's assertion that the drugs were from Mexico was true, it 
does not follow that Mr. Vantienderen was involved in an "international drug cartel." 
Further, it is likely that most drugs originate from a cartel somewhere, and this is not a 
basis for imposing consecutive sentences. Thus, the imposition of consecutive sentences 
was not justified. 
Concurrent terms should have been imposed. The crimes alleged in this case were 
not violent, and there were no victims involved. R. 104 [3-5]. Mr. Vantienderen was not 
in possession of any weapons. IcL Additionally, all of the alleged crimes at issue arose out 
of only one criminal episode. See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245 ("although defendant was 
convicted of four crimes, it is appropriate to observe that all of them arose out of one 
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criminal episode.") These facts distinguish this case from cases where consecutive 
sentences have been upheld. 
In cases where consecutive sentences have been upheld, the defendants evidenced 
a total disregard for other people's lives and safety. For example, where a defendant 
scuffled with an officer and stole the officer's firearm, then took ten hostages in a fast-
food restaurant and fired the gun twice, the Court of Appeals upheld imposition of 
consecutive sentences. State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This 
Court also upheld consecutive sentences where a defendant was violent and abusive 
throughout his three-year relationship with a woman, threw a rock through her window 
and threatened to kill her and others, and stabbed a man with a hunting knife while in a 
drunken rage. State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Finally, this 
Court upheld consecutive sentences where the defendant masterminded a scheme to 
break into a house to steal marijuana, carried a gun into the house, and fired it. State v. 
Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, f22, 12 P.3d 103. 
In this case, Mr. Vantienderen displayed no such disregard for the lives and safety 
of others. Although the prosecutor asserted that Mr. Vantienderen "endangered untold 
citizens in the streets of Salt Lake City by fleeing, endangered the lives of the police 
officers who were enforcing the laws of this State," R. 103 [7-8], the record does not 
indicate that his alleged attempt to evade the police was particularly hazardous. R. 104 
[3-4]. He does not appear to have traveled at high speeds or driven in a manner that was 
dangerous to other drivers or pedestrians. Id. Further, the sentencing court took no special 
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notice of the prosecutor's assertion. R. 103 [10]. 
Significantly, the presentence investigation report did not recommend consecutive 
sentences. R. 104 [21]. Mr. Vantienderen has expressed remorse for his crimes and has 
admitted responsibility for them. R. 45-48. Also, he has never received any form of drug 
treatment for his cocaine addiction, which is the root cause of his crimes. He has 
expressed great interest in drug treatment. R. 45-48, 103 [9], 104 [19]. In overlooking 
these points, the sentencing court failed to comply with section 76-3-401(4) which 
requires the court to consider "the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). 
The Board of Pardons and Parole occupies an advantaged position in determining 
whether Mr. Vantienderen is making progress towards rehabilitation, and when he is 
ready for release to a drug treatment program such as Odyssey House. See Smith, 909 
P.2d at 244 ("The Board is in a far better position than a court to monitor a defendant's 
subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in prison and to 
adjust the maximum sentence accordingly.") The Board should not be restrained by the 
imposition of consecutive sentences in this case, and Mr. Vantienderen's sentence should 
be vacated and this case should be remanded for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 11(e) in 
accepting Mr. Vantienderen's guilty plea, his conviction should be vacated and this case 
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remanded to the trial court with instructions to allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
Alternatively, Mr. Vantienderen's sentence should be vacated and this case should be 
remanded for resentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £l*x day of December, 2001. 
d[ta 
HEATHE^JOHNSOI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY J VANTIENDEREN, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001918643 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: February 26, 2 001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: HARMS, CLARK A. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 21, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9:04 
2nd Degree Felony 
3rd Degree Felony 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 12/14/2000 Guilty 
2. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST 
- Disposition: 12/14/2000 Guilty 
3. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC 
- Disposition: 12/14/2000 Guilty 
4. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 12/14/2000 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
Page 1 
Case No: 001918643 
Date: Feb 26, 2001 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Charges 1 and 2 are to run consecutive, while charges 3 and 4 are 
to run concurrent with other charges. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 6 month(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
$5000.00 
$0.00 
$2297.30 
$5000.00 
$5000.00 
$0 
$2297.30 
$5000.00 
Plus Interest 
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Case No: 001918643 
Date: Feb 26, 2001 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: Amount: $1520.00 
Pay in behalf of: THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Restitution: Amount: $266.80 
Pay in behalf of: THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Dated t h i s Zip day of Fe-fc , 20 01 . 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-3-401 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6Kb). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-401 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; 
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, 
ch.139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection 
(2) and redesignated the following subsections 
accordingly. 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
added Subsections (3) and (12), redesignating 
the other subsections accordingly, and made 
stylistic changes. 
ANALYSIS 
Abuse of discretion. 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Concurrent sentences. 
Consecutive sentences. 
Mitigating circumstances. 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Cited. 
Abuse of discretion. 
Although the trial court justifiably imposed 
the greatest maximum mandatory sentences 
possible under the law, it was unreasonable 
and an abuse of discretion to have imposed 
essentially a minimum mandatory life sentence 
and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons of 
discretion to take into account defendant's fu-
ture conduct and possible progress toward re-
habilitation. State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1995). 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Sentence upon conviction of second offense 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
subdivided Subsection (6). added Subsection 
(6)(b)(ii), and made related changes; substi-
tuted "of the defendant's initial sentence" for "of 
sentence for any one or more of them" in Sub-
section (7Kb); added "and the conduct giving 
rise to the present offense did not occur after 
his initial sentencing by any other court" at the 
end of Subsection (7)(c); added "When the limi-
tation of Subsection (6)(a) applies" at the begin-
ning of Subsection (8); and made stylistic 
changes. 
could not begin later than termination of first; 
court properly sentenced defendant to serve 
additional five years on conviction of perjury, to 
commence upon expiration of life sentence 
which defendant was already serving. State v. 
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967). 
Concurrent sentences. 
When the trial court declined to determine 
whether defendant's sentences would run con-
currently or consecutively and, instead, left 
"that decision to the Division of Corrections," 
the trial court's delegation to the Department of 
Corrections of the responsibilities given to it 
under this section was inappropriate, but the 
error was harmless in light of the express 
language of the statute, providing that the 
sentences run concurrentlv. State v. Hallett, 
796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). aff'd. 856 
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993). 
Consecutive sentences. 
The court did not err in imposing consecutive 
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of 
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Rule 11. Pleas-
ia) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
^presented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; • 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)'l) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
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(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — These 
amendments are intended to reflect current law 
without any substantive changes. The addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis 
in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and 
is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State 
v. Breckenndge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The 
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the 
factual basis required for those pleas. E.g. 
Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992). 
The amendments explicitly recognize that 
plea affidavits, where used, may properly be 
incorporated into the record when the trial 
court determines that the defendant has read 
(or been read) the affidavit, understands its 
contents, and acknowledges the contents. State 
v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper 
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the 
court time, eliminate some of the monotony of 
rote recitations of rights waived by pleading 
guilty, and allow a more focused and probing 
inquiry into the facts of the offense, the rela-
tionship of the law to those facts, and whether 
the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
These benefits are contingent on a careful and 
considered review of the affidavit by the defen-
dant and proper care by the trial court to verify 
tha t such a review has actually occurred. 
The final paragraph of section (e) clarifies 
that the trial court may, but need not. advise 
defendants concerning collateral consequences 
of a guilty plea. The failure to so advise does not 
affect the validity of a plea. State v. McFadden, 
884 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 
892 P2d 13 (Utah 1995). 
Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend-
ment redesignated former Subdivision (e)(4) as 
Subdivision (e)(4)(A); added Subdivision 
(e)(4)(B); and added the last two paragraphs to 
Subdivision (e). 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
U.R.E. 410. 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6. 
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Compliance wi th rule. 
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with 
this rule in accepting a guilty or no contest plea 
is good cause, as a matter of law, for the 
withdrawal of that plea. State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 
